Grid Information Retrieval Requirements

Abstract

GIR is information retrieval for computational grids. It is an effort to utilize grid computing's advantages as applied to the science of information retrieval. As with any new system design, it is important to understand stakeholder community requirements in order to develop a robust architecture and related specifications. This document details those requirements and establishes a base and context for future system architectures and specifications.

Contents

1. Introduction

GIR is information retrieval (IR) in a grid-computing context such as OGSA [OGSA-PHY]. Though core grid-computing concepts and implementations continue to evolve, GIR recognizes the inherent advantages provided by generalized grid computing, specifically as those advantages relate to the information retrieval problem space. GIR expands on decades of experience with other distributed, networked information retrieval systems such as Z39.50 [Z3950-95]. GIR seeks to 1) define functionality and semantics required by a generalized information retrieval system, 2) describe an architecture based on a particular grid-computing platform, and 3) detail specifications suitable for building and operating a complete grid-based IR system. This document specifically addresses the requirements for a generalized IR system. It is expected that one or more architectures and associated specifications will result from this work.

GIR is about moving forward to the days of network-aware search appliances, virtual organizations (VOs) for information sharing, information security at multiple levels, and large-scale high-performance searching that is customized for particular collections and information needs. In short, GIR is about enabling today's sources for electronic information (such as Web servers, database servers, portals, etc.) to be integrated into highly secure, scalable information retrieval systems.

We are not skeptical of the future of large monolithic search engines, and hold them in high respect. However, we recognize the limitations of these systems, and wish to enable future information seekers to have choices among different information retrieval systems. We further wish to make the vast quantity of information that is currently inaccessible to search engines more readily available to information seekers.

The starting point for GIR is the scientific discipline of information retrieval (IR). In IR, computer systems are used to match statements of human information need (a.k.a., queries) to documents. Statements of information need may be anything from a few words (typical of Web search engines) to a structured logic (e.g., Boolean statements) to a profile of the information seeker and her assessments of past documents.

In practice, IR seldom actually presents answers to questions, or even specific information items (such as a table of figures, or a quotation, or a particular passage in a document). Rather, IR systems present a ranked list of document citations in which, it is hoped, the desired information may be found. IR systems may be defined as those computer-based systems that take a number of documents (perhaps in different formats) as input and build data structures so that they may be quickly searched for matches to queries. These IR systems are able to then take queries (perhaps with special formatting or restrictions) as input and produce a list of documents in ranked order.

We call the set of documents input to an IR system a *collection*. For a given information need, there might be more than one IR system that gives access to a collection of interest. While the days of massive search engines have led optimistic information seekers to think that all the information in the world is a click away via their favorite search engine, even these searchers know that different search engines host different collections. More experienced searchers know that there are thousands of different collections, different data types, different query languages, and so forth.

GIR will help to make virtual organizations' collections more available to information seekers. Rather than seeking to harvest these collections into monolithic search engines, GIR seeks to utilize distributed federated collections. There are important advantages over monolithic search engines in the GIR scenario:

1. Queries will be run against collections of documents with a likelihood of possessing relevant documents, thus eliminating a priori those collections unlikely to have documents of interest. For example, someone interested in information about household pets might want to omit databases about taxidermy from consideration.

2. Each collection will be customized for that collection's qualities, according to the desires of the collection provider. Customization can include the full range of query processing, document processing and IR techniques such as document and term weights, IR retrieval models (Boolean, vector space, Latent Semantic Indexing, etc.), term stemming, stop word lists, etc.

3. Rather than seeking sub-second response times over billions of documents, as monolithic search engines do, GIR systems may seek such performance over far smaller collections. This will enable more complex query processing.

4. GIR collections, because of their smaller size and locality to a particular collection source (i.e., an organization's Web server), can be updated more quickly, thus eliminating the delay among harvest runs exhibited by search engines. Collectively, we expect the capacity of GIR to far exceed any search engine.

5. Grid computing offers a notification model in which events (such as the availability of new content) can trigger other events (such as evaluating a query against the new content). This model opens the door to standing queries, information filtering, and push (rather than pull) approaches to information dissemination.

GIR will provide a framework whereby existing, traditional IR engines may be plugged in at various parts of the architecture in order to construct a new, higher-level IR system. That is, traditional IR systems do not typically perform as distributed engines (computationally or in terms of source data), but by plugging into the GIR framework that engine (perhaps unknowingly) can become part of a larger, highly secure, computationally and data-distributed IR system.

Since grid computing typically includes the virtual organization (VO) concept at it's core, GIR inherits and supports fundamental VO characteristics, specifically the security framework. As addressed in individual requirements, GIR must go a step beyond standard service-level security, however, into finely controlled application-specific security.

2. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC 2119].

3. General Requirements

3.1 distributed

The system must be modular with clearly defined interfaces in support of leveraging traditional distributed computing advantages. The level of modularity depends on a particular software architecture, baseline network infrastructure, etc. For example, if one assumes a reliable, high bandwidth network, the system might support a greater number of smaller modules that perhaps make the system more flexible, though more complex. This requirement presumes a robust communication method among the distributed system modules.

3.2 asynchronous notification

There must be a method of sending and receiving out-of-band messages among participating modules. For example, one module (the sink) might request notification from another module (the source) upon some action or event taking place. The sink might express a desire to know when the internal state of the source has changed by "subscribing" to the source. That expression of interest, or subscription, establishes a loose link between the two modules. When the internal state of the source module changes, it sends a notification message to the sink.

3.3 event-driven operation

Modules must have the ability to immediately act upon asynchronous notification messages received from other modules.

3.4 service persistence

Each module must allow persistence of operation. A service is considered persistent if it remains available for some period of time after initial creation in order to service subsequent operational requirements. Such service persistence implies methods for creation and explicit destruction of modules by authorized parties. Typically, there will be other methods of module destruction including inactivity timers, etc.

3.5 query persistence

Relevant modules may allow persistent queries. A persistent query is defined as a long-lived query against a particular set of indices and its result set may be updated perhaps via scheduling or triggered by an event such as index update. For example, if a new document becomes available to a collection, that may trigger dependent indexers to update themselves based on the updated collection. In turn, an updated index may notify dependent processes maintaining persistent queries, such that the final result may be updated in a real-time, efficient manner.

3.6 metadata services

All modules must be introspective in terms of access mechanism as well as semantic description. For example, a module may provide a list of access methods and parameter data types via WSDL. It must also describe the contents of its document, collection, index, and query holdings both in a machine and human-usable manner, e.g. Dublin Core metadata records.

3.7 data collection description services

There must be methods to describe an abstract data collection to a management service. An abstract collection description might include specific URLs, spidering rules, transformation rules, etc. A data collection description is considered input to a process that results in a collection.

3.8 data collection scheduling services

There may be methods to schedule periodic collection updates, perhaps as an extension of the data collection description. For example, a data collection description may describe crawling a particular web site, an associated schedule might specify how often to re-crawl the site.

3.9 data collection delivery services

There must be a mechanism for reliable file transport of collected raw data from data collection modules. There may be methods of transporting partial sets of data, e.g. `diff` output.

3.10 document content type independent

The system must be capable of acting on arbitrary data formats (content types). Specifically, the system must be able to describe and transport arbitrary data, but individual modules do not have to support that particular type of data. For example, a collection may consist of text/plain and text/html files, but an indexer may invoke standard diagnostic services to deny support of the text/html files. Typically, the required metadata services would provide a list of supported data formats.

3.11 document transformation capabilities

There may be services to transform documents from one content-type to another or to post-process documents based on a set of rules or parameters.

3.12 index generation services based on input collections

There must be a method of creating a searchable index based on one or more data collections. How a collection is actually indexed, if at all, is outside the scope. In practice, there is a common denominator set of options and parameters for most indexer applications. This set should be reflected through the appropriate service interfaces and translated to a particular system as necessary.

3.13 index query services generating result sets

An index must have the ability to accept queries and respond with relevant result sets. A query is a representation of the user's information needs, typically expressed either as simple keywords or in a normalized, structured manner, for example common query language (CQL). A result set is a set of metadata describing documents matching the user query, suitable for subsequent document retrieval via related services.

3.14 query type independent

There must be a mechanism for specifying arbitrary query types. Practically speaking, a small number of query types, e.g. CQL, will actually be supported but there must be the ability to unambiguously describe arbitrary query types for special-purpose use and future expansion.

3.15 minimum query type

To assure interoperability, there must be at least one particular type of query supported by the system. The query type should leverage existing open standards. The selected query type must at least support keyword queries, arbitrarily complex Boolean queries, and attributes on individual elements of the query. Attributes must include at least a field identifier in support of structured queries.

3.16 result set delivery services

There must be a method of retrieving result sets from indexers. The service must allow a user to retrieve one or more ranges of records from the set. Each record returned is subject to the data presentation requirement listed below.

3.17 result set deletion

There must be a method of deleting a remote result set.

3.18 record presentation

For each result set record requested, there should be a method of requesting parts of a record (e.g. Z39.50 element sets) and in a particular format (e.g. mime content type). There is no requirement that a request for a particular element set/content type request be honored by the record host.

3.19 index scan services

There may be indexer scanning services, a service for browsing the contents of an index, e.g. words contained in an index. A scanning service typically provides lists of words that actually appear in an index in support of better quality query formation.

3.20 peer-to-peer communication model

The data communication model must support peer-to-peer communications, for example to support arbitrary linkages among multiple participating (possibly persistent) modules in support of a given task.

3.21 client-server communication model

The traditional client-server communication model should be supported. For example, a simple client may only know how to send a single request to an index and receive a single response during a session.

3.22 distributed searching

The system must support the ability to distribute a single query across multiple search modules and expect standard behavior.

3.23 merging

The system must have facilities to merge two or more result sets into a single result set. The actual basis of that merge should be as orthogonal as possible.

3.24 multi-lingual capable

The system must be capable of unambiguously describing the language of content data. A particular module need not support any particular language, however. For example, an indexer may know it has received German language content, but it may not know how to properly search such data and may issue relevant diagnostics.

4. Security Considerations

Information security is a major component for data sets. Security concerns might occur at the level of datum (i.e., a document), user or query source, or an entire set of data or its IR system. At the least, GIR must provide a security level that assures the same level of security that is associated with the data in the system. With GIR, issues of data channel and system-level security are largely met by the underlying infrastructure, such as that provided by OGSA [OGSASec] through ongoing work with Web Services Security [WSSec]. A set of additional security challenges for GIR is based on the security requirements of the information content.

Security management in information and network systems has three basic principles [SecurityHandbook] that are targeted as goals that a good security infrastructure should be able to fulfill:

confidentiality - Confidentiality means protecting the system so unauthorized access to the information is not allowed. A crucial aspect of confidentiality is user identification and authentication.

integrity - Integrity is the protection of system data and process from intentional or accidental unauthorized changes. To maintain integrity it is important to ensure that the information does not get accidentally or intentionally destroyed or modified. It is also important that threats or breaches are detected and rectified.

availability - Availability is the assurance that a computer system is accessible by authorized users whenever needed. It is important that authorized users get access to the resources when required.

Security issues for the GIR requirements specified above are:

4.1 authentication

Identity of the user and the services should be mutually established during any session. "User" in this context could be an individual, a group of users or another grid service.

4.2 authorization

Authorization is the procedure of determining what the user is allowed to do and it is required at various levels:

4.2.1 hosting environment authorization

Grid Services typically run in a hosting environment, which could be the operating system, J2EE environment, a Tomcat servlet container, etc.. Access to these environments may need to be restricted.

4.2.2 service-level authorization

There may be an authorization scheme at a coarse-grained level of the service restricting access to authorized users. The GIR services must enforce the authorization decision as either "allow" or "deny". It is likely that a GIR service response may be asynchronous in the case where the authorization decision may not be able to be determined immediately (for example, if a human must make an authorization decision). The GIR service may provide additional information regarding pending decisions.

4.2.3 index-level authorization

There may be an authorization scheme to provide authorized access to a particular index. The GIR service must enforce the authorization decision as either "allow" or "deny". It is likely that a GIR service response may be asynchronous in the case where the authorization decision may not be able to be determined immediately (for example, if a human must make an authorization decision). The GIR service may provide additional information regarding pending decisions.

4.2.4 record-level authorization

There may be an authorization scheme to provide authorized access to a particular record within an index. The GIR services must enforce the authorization decision as either "allow" or "deny". It is likely that a GIR service response may be asynchronous in the case where the authorization decision may not be able to be determined immediately (for example, if a human must make an authorization decision). The GIR service may provide additional information regarding pending decisions. A record within an index may not be a complete data item. For example, it might be a URL pointing to a non-Grid resource. GIR does not specify or control access to such external data items. Furthermore, GIR does not include sub-record-level authorization i.e., does not restrict access based on data items within a record.

4.3 identity management

Identities associated with services and users need to be established and maintained. Users are likely to have multiple identities based on their roles in different virtual organizations.

4.4 single sign-on

It is important the identity and credential integrates with the user's already existing local security policies. Mapping between a local identity and a Grid identity may need to be performed. The user should be allowed to access services across multiple domains using his local authentication and eliminating the need to re-authenticate.

4.5 delegation

Users may require services to access other services on his behalf. Thus, the user needs to be able to delegate his credential for such transactions.

4.6 credential renewal

In typical Grid systems, temporary or proxy credentials created from the longer-term credential of a short lifetime are used. Persistence of queries and services in GIR requires that there be mechanisms to renew the temporary credential when it expires.

4.7 intrusion detection system

Mechanisms and monitoring practices to detect threats and breaches should be included in the security plan for the system. Administrative and system actions and policies, based on the local practices, in the event of an attack should be considered.

4.8 logging and audit

User actions and system activities need to be logged. This is vital to audit security threats and breaches. It is likely that a system may also want to use these for accounting. Policies on when logs must be retained or disposed are outside the scope of this discussion, and may need to adhere to external guidelines for data retention, privacy, or archiving.

5. Use Case Scenarios

The editors envision uses of Grid information retrieval in which information seekers arrange the different elements of GIR into a system responsive to different types of information needs. One typical need might be an alternative to monolithic search engines for when such engines do not offer sufficiently sophisticated capabilities, or when security constraints limit their use. Within organizations, there may be diverse data sources (such as different units or departments, each of which produces sets of data with different types on different timescales). For example, a business might have a technical product support unit that has textual documents in XML markup or other formats, and a manufacturing unit that tracks part numbers, inventories and their relations to manufacturing plant facilities.

In this type of organization, an information seeker might want to find out whether some technical documentation was outdated based on changing manufacturing processes or materials. GIR offers two important capabilities over alternatives: federation, and security. Because the datasets (technical documents and manufacturing information) are not available to the outside world, they could not be harvested by public search engines. By creating two separate IR indexes, perhaps with different IR systems or settings, search is enabled. GIR offers the ability to search across both datasets and merge results, based on the capabilities of each IR system. Because GIR operates within the secure Grid computing environment, desired access controls are built in, both for outsiders and within or across organizational units.

A different use case scenario is information filtering. GIR will offer the ability to set up long-running queries against dynamic datasets, which is also known as information filtering. Information filters can be complex representations of information need, and can be modified, tuned or trained over time. For example, environmental analysts might monitor a wide variety of data sources. GIR will include elements to continuously monitor these sources such that when change events occur, indexing events may be triggered. If newly added items exceed a threshold in the filter, they are presented to the information seeker. Because the filter would be an active long-running process, it could combine or re-present data items. For example, if the environmental analyst were interested in threats to endangered and threatened species, a news item from one source about a wildfire in California might be combined with an item from another source about legislation protecting bald eagles that live in that part of the United States.

6. Glossary

Collection - A named set of documents and associated metadata.

CQL - Common Query Language

Document - A digital entity with an associated content type and other descriptive metadata.

Index - A real or virtual entity representing (possible) data structures and methods for rapidly identifying a relevant subset of documents from a set of collections based on a query or other parameters.

IR - Information Retrieval

OGSA - Open Grid Services Architecture

VO - virtual organization

WSDL - Web Services Description Language

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10. References

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